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| Completing the Revolution |
Posted by Karl on Friday April 12, @02:03PM
...The Copernican revolution, that is. What I'm talking about is the book Where Mathematics Comes From, by George Lakoff and Rafael Nunez. It may sound dry but this is important stuff, because the authors show how modern cognitive science has finally toppled the ancient Pythagorean and Platonic religion of mathematics as transcending humanity. This is significant because a very large proportion of scientists, engineers and programmers believe, secretly or openly, in this religion.
Over the past few centuries we've learned that the sun does not revolve around the earth. We've learned that we evolved from smaller (I won't say lesser) creatures over aeons of time. We've learned that our behavior is that of a particular kind of primate, and that even our most sophisticated endeavors all reflect our evolutionary heritage.
But, throughout this process of social disappointment and readjustment, we've always been able to say that at least mathematics is a real and incontrovertible link to the Divine. At least here, in the fortress of our own minds, we can transcend our earthly shell.
Well, no, we can't.
As Lakoff and Nunez show in exhaustive detail in this book, cognitive science has uncovered how the human thought processes underlying mathematical reasoning actually work. These thought processes, it turns out, aren't just different from the classical and Platonic models of human reasoning--they preclude them. Very briefly put, we reason mathematically by using systems of metaphor that are grounded in our use of the human body and in its sensorimotor system. There is no evidence that mathematical reasoning (as opposed to calculation) can be done in any other way and still be what we would recognize as mathematical. Mathematical thinking, it turns out, has no features that are different from other kinds of thought, it simply organizes these mental activities in a particular way.
At the very root of math lies metaphor; and at the root of metaphor lies the human body, which is both the dictionary and grammar of the metaphor-using brain. Mathematics never breaks free of its grounding in human existence; it can't (although, once again, calculation can be performed by machines, but calculation is not mathematical reasoning). The pythagorean religion is dead with our generation.
Of course, there have been rumblings of this sort for over a century. Russel and Godel undermined the self-consistency of math; but they didn't touch the issue of transcendence. The results of the cognitive scientists are of a completely different order, because not only have they shown that we perform math using the metaphor system grounded in our animal bodies; one could continue to argue that some sort of perfect transcendental mathematics exists that we clumsily mimic using our crude brains. In fact, the results of cognitive studies have shown that our actual ways of thinking about math indicate clearly that no such transcendent mathematical realm exists.
To understand that argument, you should read the book. I will say, however, that over the years I've known many people who are literally fanatical in their Pythagorean beliefs. It's very common for professionals and scientists to adhere to a quiet faith in the existence of a realm of mathematical truth that exists outside the universe itself, eternal and inviolable. The level of fanaticism in such people is often so deep that they will never accept the findings of Lakoff and Nunez, no matter how they're explained. In this, our best and brightest descend to the level of the worst religious fanatics that they themselves hold in contempt.
A perfect example is provided by one of the customer reviews of the book on Amazon.com's website. Here's how he starts out:
Firstly, I must admit I have not read the book.
It gets better. He goes on to say, ...The Book, "Where Mathematics Comes From" is flawed in that it attempts to describe the very mathematics that determines who we are and how our metaphorical conceptions evolve. We live in a Universe whose processes are determined by mathematical and physical laws. As such our embodied metaphorically predisposed minds are very much a product of that mathematics. Turner and Nunez have erred on this point. Our metaphors may determine how we perceive mathematics but, more importantly, it is the mathematics that determines how we become predisposed to use metaphor.
I've bolded the key indicator of where this reviewer's reasoning goes completely astray. He or she begins with the assumption that mathematics exists outside the universe, and shapes it from outside via actually existent, physical laws. In fact, scientists today tend to view physical laws as formulations to describe pre-existing phenomena; they are descriptions, not laws. The old way of thinking is that Newton saw the law of gravity as it exists in the mind of God; the modern view is that he used a special language to accurately describe a particular class of observations and potential observations. The reviewer above assumes without evidence that mathematics comes prior to physical reality, and so has no need to read the book. In fact, everything in Where Mathematics Comes From clearly shows that the world works the other way around: the orderly physical world allows us to formulate reliable descriptions of it using the language of mathematics.
So, dear reader, assuming that you care about such things, how adventurous are you, really? Do you believe in the old Pythagorean heaven, a perfect mathematical realm existing parallel but separate to our own? Or are you willing to strike out in a new direction, one more human-centric? I am; it's my commitment to such new directions that led to the name of this website, after all. I want to write SF that reflects a worldview of clearly 21st century pedigree, which is why books like Where Mathematics Comes From inspire me.
What I hope will come from these studies (if I may don my SF-writer hat and look into the future) is a gradual shift in society away from an awed acceptance of the pronouncements of scientists and mathematical thinkers, towards a direct engagement with them as peers. The accuracy and value of mathematics can't be denied, especially not by the findings presented in this book; but the arrogance of an intellectual class that pretends to have a private pipeline to God in the form of mathematical truth can be reduced. Actually, there's scope for a better kind of pride now that we know the transcendent mathematical realm doesn't exist; a mathematician can no longer pretend modesty and claim he or she simply discovered what was there all along. No--you made it. Be proud of your creation, but don't hide behind the Ozma-mask of transcendence; be prepared to own mathematics as your creation.
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| Recommended |
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A sublime, even mystical contemplation of our place in the universe.
Star Maker can't really be called a novel--not when its protagonist is God and its plot consists
not just in the rise and fall of Creation, but the rise and fall of an infinite number of
Creations. The Star Maker makes universe after universe in its attempt to create a companion for
itself. Our own universe is one of its fair-to-middling experiments. Not a success as fiction,
this book is nonetheless breathtaking for the sweep of its ideas. Makes you wish more writers
were this daring--or more publishers.
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Re: Completing the Revolution
by Scott Bakker on Thursday December 05, @01:17PM
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If metaphors are a semantic category, and if semantics is nowhere near being naturalized (which is to say, accounted for in scientfically acceptable terms), then how can Lakoff's conclusion be anything other than yet one more philosophical entry on a long and probably interminable debate? The problem here lies in the term 'Cognitive Science,' which, although it proceeds by hypothesis and shares certain procedural similarities with the natural sciences, is more akin to alchemy than to chemistry. It cannot even provide a scientific explanation for it's fundamental category: cognition. This is not to say it's worthless - alchemy was a necessary precondition of chemistry - only that it's limits need to be recalled.
That said, I am NOT espousing mathematical platonism. The bottom line is that NOBODY knows, not really, so why not bite the bullet and be a mathematical agnostic?
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Re: Completing the Revolution
by Karl on Monday February 10, @08:45AM
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You should not treat a science with contempt simply because its subject matter is too messy or squishy to be codified using mathematics. Physics has long reigned as the queen of sciences because of the mathematical method; but the underlying assumption there is once again that the mathematical methods somehow make it "more true" than other sciences. After all, mathematics is transcendent, right?...
So which is more true? Theory or observation? I would say the latter, which is what cognitive science depends on: it is a realm of replicable empirical experiment, and therefore definitely science, definitely not alchemy. It therefore has authority, whether or not its results can be formulated in mathemtical terms.
To put it another way, if you don't assume that mathematics is the language of a transcendent truth, then those sciences that lord it over the 'soft' sciences by using mathematical precision (physics, chemistry) have no call to do so. What is decisive in doing real science is replicable experiment, not mathematical theory.
At some point, however, natural science does smack up against philosophy--for instance, in the 'observer problem' in quantum mechanics. Nothing is proven yet about the fundamental constitution of the universe; you can continue to believe in the transcendent Platonic realm if you really want to. Just as long as you realize that it's a belief not grounded in empirical fact.
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Re: Completing the Revolution
by Scott Bakker on Tuesday March 11, @09:33AM
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Hi Karl. A couple of clarifications.
You say that I " can continue to believe in the transcendent Platonic realm if [I] really want to..." I'm not sure where you get this, since I say quite clearly that I'm not a mathematical Platonist. I'm an agnostic who thinks cognitive science has nowhere near the resources it needs to definitively answer such an issue. Explaining mathematics with metaphor is simply explaining one mystery in terms of another. Interesting perspectives might be generated, but certainly nothing like a definitive answer.
You say I "should not treat a science with contempt simply because its subject matter is too messy or squishy to be codified using mathematics..." I never said anything regarding 'codification in mathematics,' so I'm not sure what you mean. As far as regarding cognitive science with contempt, nothing further could be the case! I simply think that it's provisional status needs to be recalled, particularly when it's used to explain semantic phenomena such as mathematics, metaphor, and so on. To say a science is provisional is to say that it's just getting off the ground - which it clearly is. Nothing contemptible about that! Rather, it's admirable, much as alchemy is admirable.
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Re: Completing the Revolution
by Karl on Tuesday March 11, @01:21PM
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I infer from what you're saying that you believe a science is provisional if it lacks a complete theoretical framework or finished observations. But I'm not sure I buy that--astronomy could be considered a genuine science even before the development of an understanding of nuclear fusion, for instance. It's not a question of "resources" whatever that word means; it's a matter of constructing the right kind of experiment, and cognitive science doesn't need particle accelerators or gigantic budgets to do that. Cognitive science is only like alchemy if it eschews scientific method, no? And while I agree that it is just getting started, that doesn't mean it can't make significant discoveries, nor does it mean that those things it does discover won't pass the test of time. The results reported in "Where Mathematics Comes From" are largely observational--hence, like an astronomical discovery, say of the existence of Neptune, they're independent of an understanding of deeper processes, just as we can know Neptune exists independently of knowing how planets form. If experiment consistently shows that humans cannot do mathematics except through metaphoric processes that are grounded in primary human sensorimotor processes, how is that not a definitive answer? Meticulous tests are done, results come back. That's science.
But really, it's not me you're arguing with here. In order for me to accept your criticism of these findings, I'd like to know that you've at least actually read the book--or that you have some substantive reason for dismissing cognitive science as incapable of making real discoveries. Otherwise, your objections smack of the same deliberate blindness of the reviewer quoted above, who started out by saying, "First let me say that I haven't read the book." You're saying, "First let me say that I don't believe cognitive science can make substantive discoveries," which amounts to the same thing.
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Re: Completing the Revolution
by Scott Bakker on Tuesday March 11, @02:43PM
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First, no, I haven't read the book, though I have read two of Lakoff's previous works and attended a presentation of his. Great guy.
My response is based on parallel arguments he makes regarding semantics in general. The problem he faces is one that looms large in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind: the problem of NATURALIZING semantics. Unless he's come up an account of meaning that commands scientific consensus (which is the holy grail), then he's simply philosophizing with the aid of science, pure and simple, and all he's offering us a possible interpretation of a possible state of affairs. Valuable in it's own right, no doubt, but far from 'scientific proof of the falsity of mathematical platonism.'
From a strictly scientific view, the threat is not that there's no such thing as platonic forms, but that there's no such thing as meaning period, and that what we experience as meaning is simply an illusion generated by certain hardware and evolutionary limitations of our brain. My suspicion is that it's the loaded interpretative apparatus that Lakoff brings to neurophysiological observations that does much of his work.
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Re: Completing the Revolution
by Karl on Wednesday March 12, @09:19AM
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Ah! I see. Perhaps I was misjudging your argument, after all. I can't disagree with your criticism--except to say that it's a criticism of all science as far as I can see. And in the absence of a solution to the problem of naturalizing semantics, one as to work with what one's got. You run up against the same issues in interpretations of quantum mechanics other than the Cophenhagen interpretation. If what Lakoff's got is reproducible empirical data of how humans think about math, then it is up to his detractors to produce a coherent account that also fits the data, rather than merely arguing it away. (I'm reminded of that story about the Sophist school in ancient Greece. A young initiate walked in to find the elders arguing about how many teeth there were in a horse's mouth. He piped up with "Why don't we just walk out to the stables and take a look?" He was kicked out of the school.) The lack of another interpretation of the data or falsifying experiments is what I'm not seeing coming from your corner. In other words, yes the philosophical problems still remain, but that most emphatically does not mean that it's not possible to look in the horse's mouth.
Consider this: it may be impossible to naturalize semantics. I tend to believe that this is the case, but we don't know. (To be specific, I accept Nietzsche's argument that if meaning doesn't exist, then neither does illusion; saying that meaning is simply an illusion is obfuscatory, or, more exactly, rhetorical.) Should we wait until the debate is complete before we continue doing cognitive science? Or, perhaps, should we continue doing empirical studies but simply lock up the results without interpreting them, even if they overwhelmingly point in one direction? I'm with Niels Bohr on this one: you cannot escape having a "loaded interpretive apparatus"--ever. All you can do is to acknowledge that apparatus as a component of your observations.
In other words, observations of the material world have as much force as philosophical arguments, but said observations always come with a philosophical perspective coloring them. I understand this; so does Lakoff. The problem you face is that there is no large-scale account of the meaning of scientific knowledge, and yet science gets done. Forget cognitive science: the lack of a naturalized semantics cuts through all of empiricism. But science gets done. When I said above that "you can continue to believe in Platonism if you want to", this is what I meant. You can continue to believe in the Creation, or in spontaneous generation of organisms, if you want to--because all of science lacks the account of meaning that you're asking for. Yet science continues to draw conclusions about the nature of the world. This is a crisis, but it's not a crisis for science.
So my personal view is more restricted than you might be assuming: I'm with Bohr on how empiricism works--it is limited in its ability to make statements that are "true"--but if I interpret him right, then Lakoff and I are able to believe that empirically, the Platonic mathematical model is disproved, even though we lack a connection between this empirical understanding, and any sort of philosophical "truth".
"Nonetheless, it moves."
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Re: Completing the Revolution
by Scott Bakker on Friday March 14, @08:35AM
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We're pretty much of one mind then. My hunch is that semantics will always elude functional explanation, which is to say, always elude science. I look forward to discussing this at Ad Astra!
But I'm not sure your 'triviality' argument (that the 'semantic dilemma' is simply the cost of doing science) against my complaint has much bite. The dilemma is particularly piquant in cognitive science, where many, and certainly all of the most interesting, explananda, involve the intentional phenomena of experience. Certainly this alters the stakes - and stability - of Lakoff's claim, no?
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Re: Completing the Revolution
by Karl on Monday April 14, @02:26PM
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Point taken--I absolutely agree. Thanks for the great discussion!
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